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Abstract 
The current Home Office guidance on the operation of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme, 
known as 'Clare's Law', has the illogical and (in some ways) unfair effect of preventing the 
disclosureof spentconvictions or cautions, and any information relating to those offences - but not 
the disclosure of allegations, arrests or charges which did not lead to a conviction (or caution) at any 
point. This has the result of limiting the real effectiveness of the Domestic Violence Disclosure 
Scheme, because the criminal convictions of some individuals cannot be shared with a vulnerable 
member of the public who might be seeking to learn of them, and also creates an imbalance in the 
fairness of its operation, since those with 'criminality information' categorised by only a lower level 
of legal certainty or standard of proof, of sorts, might see their right to respect for private and family 
life more easily and readily infringed. This piece seeks to outline some reasons as to why the 
doctrinal assumptions made about the inability of disclosure of spent convictions under the Scheme 
may be said to be flawed. The case is made, in this way, for placing the Scheme on a statutory 
footing to resolve this illogicality resulting from a particular doctrinal ambiguity which has limited 
the effectiveness of the Scheme in its first year of national operation.  
Introduction 
'Clare's Law' is a Home Office policy, rather than a 'law' per se, which allows for members of the 
public to seek a disclosure, from the police, of any information which might confirm a suspicion that 
their partner, a somehowthreatening or violent person, has some kind of 'history' retained by the 
police in relation to offences relating to domestic violence1. This is the 'right to ask' element of the 
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policy, which is formally known as the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme ('the Scheme')2. The 
'right to know' element of the Scheme is able to be drawn upon by social workers, probation officers, 
health professionals, and other responsible individuals who work as part of the 'public protection 
routine', and who might want the police to consider a disclosure to a person they feel might be at 
risk of domestic violence from a 'subject', or domestic violence perpetrator3. In this way, the Scheme 
operates on a 'multi-agency' basis4, and so operates in a broadly parallel fashion to other public 
protection information disclosure processes, such as the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme5 or 
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA)6. 
By the 8th of March 2015, the national operation of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (the 
Scheme) had been been in place for one year. In that time, I authored an article for the Journal of 
Criminal Law which dwelt upon the way that the Scheme appears to be based upon Home Office 
guidance which does not sufficiently emphasise the procedural rights of 'subjects', or alleged/actual 
perpetrators of domestic violence; or indeed, outline a sufficiently nuanced proportionality test for 
disclosure in that regard7.  
Furthermore, and more recently, the BBC and other media sources have commented on the 
freedom-of-information figures obtained and publicised by the Press Association, which 
demonstrate that following the onset of the Scheme in England and Wales more than 3,000 requests 
had been made in around ten months. While it was revealed that in that period more than 1, 300 
disclosures were made, it is also the case that different forces nationally have been applying the 
Scheme guidance differently, to the extent that the rate of disclosure based on the assessment of 
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the required 'pressing need' following an either a 'right to ask' or a 'right to know' application has 
varied greatly, force by force8.  
I want to offer up a supplementary analysis and criticism of the current operation of the Scheme, 
which is, in this instance, much more about the (unnecessary) limitation of the Scheme as an 
effective operational policy. This limitation of the Scheme's effectiveness comes about because of 
the way that the Scheme guidance precludes the police from using the processes of the Scheme to 
disclose any information at all to a concerned member of the public that relates to a spentconviction 
for a domestic violence-related matter or offence9. But this limitation, arguably, need not be in place 
- and because it is in place, as I highlight below, it has the perverse effect of placing at a distinct 
disadvantage those who are never convicted for domestic violence related offences (following 
allegations, arrests or charges in relation to the same), compared to those who are indeed convicted, 
and over time see their relevant convictions become spent (if that is possible, given the seriousness 
of the offence concerned). 
The framework provided for 'rehabilitation' and 'spent' convictions under the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974  
People convicted of criminal offences and/or subject to other varieties of criminal sanctions are 
deemed to be legally 'rehabilitated' and their conviction(s) or other sanction(s) to be 'spent' when a 
period of time has passed without further re-offending - as long as that offence, or the sentence 
imposed, does not pass a particular threshold of seriousness in the contextof the offence 
concerned10. 
 
Recent guidance from the Ministry of Justice, issued following the 2014 reform of the legal 
framework under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, describes how the periods of time taken 
for convictions and other sanctions to become spent can vary: 
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"The rehabilitation period (the length of time before a caution or conviction becomes spent) is 
determined by the type of disposal administered or the length of the sentence imposed. 
Rehabilitation periods that run beyond the end of a sentence are made up of the total sentence 
length plus an additional period that runs from the end of the sentence, which we have called the 
‘buffer period’. Other rehabilitation periods start from the date of conviction or the date the penalty 
was imposed…The ‘buffer periods’ are halved for those who are under 18 at date of conviction (save 
for custodial sentences of six months or less where the ‘buffer period’ is 18 months)."11 
 
On this issue, the Ministry of Justice guidance sets out a useful table (adapted for this piece as 
follows):12 
Sentence/disposal  Buffer period for adults  
(18 and over at the time of 
conviction or the time the disposal 
is administered).  
This applies from the end date of 
the sentence (including the licence 
period).  
Buffer period for young people 
(under 18 at the time of conviction 
or the time the disposal is 
administered). This applies from 
the end date of the sentence 
(including the licence period).  
Custodial sentence of over 4 years, or a 
public protection sentence  
Never spent  Never spent  
Custodial sentence of over 30 months (2 ½ 
years) and up to and including 48 months 
(4 years)  
7 years  3½ years  
Custodial sentence of over 6 months and 
up to and including 30 months (2 ½ years)  
4 years  2 years  
Custodial sentence of 6 months or less  2 years  18 months  
Community order or youth rehabilitation 
order 
1 year  6 months  
 
 
The effect of a conviction or caution becoming spent isthen broadly outlined in the guidance 
concerned as follows: 
 
"For most purposes the 1974 Act treats a rehabilitated person as if he or she had never committed, 
or been charged with charged or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence and, as 
such, they are not required to declare their spent caution(s) or conviction(s), for example, when 
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applying for most jobs or insurance, some educational courses and housing applications… [while] 
…All cautions and convictions may eventually become spent, with the exception of prison sentences, 
or sentences of detention for young offenders, of over four years and all public protection sentences 
regardless of the length of sentence… Once a caution or conviction has become spent under the 
1974 Act, a person does not have to reveal it or admit its existence in most circumstances. Unless an 
exception applies [emphasis in the original]… spent cautions and convictions need not be disclosed 
when filling in a form, or at a job interview. An employer cannot refuse to employ someone (or 
dismiss someone) because he or she has a spent caution or conviction unless an exception 
applies."13 
 
The issues of illogicality and perversity outlined in the Introduction above, come about as a result of 
how the Home Office guidance on the operation of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme align 
the framework of the rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 with the aims and processes of the 
Scheme, in, I would argue, an overly cautious fashion, doctrinally-speaking. 
 
The (non-)operation of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme with regard to spent convictions 
and related information 
 
The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme guidance, produced by the Home Office and followed by 
police forces in England and Wales at the time of writing, determines that: 
 
"Information disclosed [under the Scheme] may include:  
"i. un-spent convictions held by B on any offence related to domestic violence (see annex A for 
guidance on offences that may be disclosed);  
"ii. information where, even if B does not possess any convictions, it indicates that B poses a risk of 
harm to A."1415 
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Because of the operational limitation of the Scheme described in this way in the Home Office 
guidance, we might assume that that the author(s) of that guidance had in mind the language of 
S.4(3)(a) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 in creating this limitation. In S.4(3)(a) the Act 
provides that: 
 
"any obligation imposed on any person by any rule of law or by the provisions of any agreement or 
arrangement to disclose any matters to any other person shall not extend to requiring him to 
disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction (whether the 
conviction is his own or another's);". 
 
The relevant 'obligation' in the context of the Scheme has clearly been viewed as the Scheme itself: 
that is, the Scheme is an 'arrangement' that applies to the work of the police, to be relied upon by 
those who now enjoy the 'right to ask', or who are professionally drawing upon the 'right to know'. 
But the Scheme does not, I would argue, create an obligation to disclose any information relating to 
a 'subject' under the Scheme - I would argue instead that the Scheme creates a framework for the 
exercise of discretionwith regard to potentially disclosing the same information - according to the 
presence, as articulated in the Scheme guidance, of a 'pressing need' for that disclosure, and on a 
basis that is otherwise lawful and proportionate. Taking this view as to the Scheme operating on the 
basis of policediscretion in decision-making, rather than an obligation as such, opens up the doctrinal 
possibility that the provisions of the 1974 do not apply strictly to the common law-based Scheme.  
Even if there was a sense that trying to determine the extent to which the operation of the Scheme 
is based on an obligation (resulting from the common law duty on the police to protect the public, as 
revisited below) or a discretion to do so by disclosing criminal records information is a moot point 
only, there is another issue as to distinctions on the meaning of the term 'obligation', as in S.4(3)(a) 
of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. This is the idea that the Human Rights Act 1998, and 
more to point the 'positive obligation' placed on the police to uphold the rights (meaning the safety 
from harm) of potential victims of domestic violence, which results from European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence16 as well as the common law of England and Wales,17 might mean that in the 
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context of the operation of the Scheme, the strict language of S.4(3)(a) of the 1974 Act should be 
'read down', as it were, from the police perspective, in terms of their common law powers to share 
information (even relating to spent convictions) . 
In any event, the very need to speculate or hypothesise as to this doctrinal issue highlights a 
weakness of the Scheme itself, since this is where the basis of the Scheme on police common law 
powers, construed narrowly in a waywhicheffectively precludes one category of 'risk' information 
sharing, is a distinct flaw of the Scheme. If the Scheme was placed on a statutory footing, then the 
language of the 1974 Act would in turn be impliedly amended or more clearly construed - as it is in 
the context of other avenues of the sharing of criminal records or 'criminality information' which are 
on that self-same statutory footing.  
Statutory avenues of sharing and disclosing spent convictions or cautions and related criminality 
information  
Commonly, an Act of Parliament which creates a means of public protection information sharing, 
such as the examples I offer here, below, will be construed as impliedly amending the scope and 
effect of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. 
Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs) are created using a process, and related statutory 
police powers under S.113B of the Police Act 1997 as amended,  to disclose even spent convictions 
and related information to the Disclosure and Barring Service. These ECRCs are used by employers to 
vet their potential recruits in sensitive positions and so protect the public, particularly children and 
vulnerable adults, from potential harms posed by 'risky' individuals.18 In another example, Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) that are based on a statutory mechanism 
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underpinned by provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 can involve the disclosure to members of 
the public particular information relating to the 'offence histories' of those offenders who pose a 
high risk to them or persons in their care.19 Furthermore, the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme 
(known as 'Sarah's Law) is not only a kind of policy forerunner to the Domestic Violence Disclosure 
Scheme, being similar in operation if different in the type of offence it is aimed at preventing, but is 
actually based upon S.327A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 - and not common law powers, as with 
the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme. There is then considerable policy precedent, as it were, 
for the re-creation of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme on a statutory footing.  
But, I would argue, there may not even be the need for new legislation in that way: a broader and 
more encompassing view of the scope of police common law powers to disclosure criminality 
information, as well as the positive obligations on the police to take measures to protect the public, 
may allow for simply the re-writing of the Home Office guidance on the operation of the Domestic 
Violence Disclosure Scheme, and the inclusion of the sharing of spent convictions and related 
information in its scope. 
The common law basis of disclosures under the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme 
Hale LJ recently observed in the Supreme Court judgment in Michael v Chief Constable of South 
Wales [2015] UKSC 2 (at para. 195) that: 
""There is no doubt that the police owe a positive duty in public law to protect members of the 
public from harm caused by third parties. In Glasbrook Brothers Ltd v Glamorgan County Council 
[1925] AC 270, the House of Lords held that the police have a duty to take all steps which appear 
necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime and for protecting from criminal injury. The 
House also approved a statement by Pickford LJ in Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v Glamorganshire 
Standing Joint Committee [1916] 2 KB 206, 229, that a party threatened with violence from another 
is entitled to protection, whatever the rights and wrong of their dispute." 
 
Considerably more recently, in X v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1985] 1 W.L.R. 420 
Whitford J (at 421) outlined the notion that with regard to Section 4 of the Rehabilitation of 
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Offenders Act 1974 it could be agreed that "there is no positive duty imposed in general terms upon 
persons not to disclose what are conveniently referred to as “spent convictions"". 
 
So there are still common law powers of the police to share criminal records information, I would 
argue, that both pre-date the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, and have continued to prove a 
lawful basis forthe operation of the Domestic ViolenceDisclosure Scheme, as the Scheme guidance 
acknowledges. But this is now an era where the police owe duties as 'positive obligations' under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 to potentialvictims of domestic violence - to protect them from risk of harm - 
with one way of so doing potentially being the disclosure to them of even spent convictions and 
related information under the Scheme.20 
 
There is also a jarring inconsistency that comes about as a result of the supposed relationship 
between the Scheme guidance and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. This stems from the 
issue that matters of criminal 'process' such as a recorded allegation, an arrest or charge, for 
example, that did not lead to a conviction can then logically never relate to a spent conviction, and 
so could theoretically always be disclosed as an item of information under the Scheme (though the 
correctly-applied proportionality test or principle might preclude the disclosure of rather old, or very 
old, 'criminality information'). This is while the same 'conduct' or 'process' information (such as an 
allegation, arrest, or charge) in relation to a person for whom this did relate to a now-spent 
conviction is actually excluded from disclosure under the ambit of the Scheme according to the 
current Home Office guidance. 
 
There is then the issue that the application of rules in the Scheme guidance about non-disclosure of 
'process' and 'conduct' information that stems from a conviction being spent for the purposes of the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 might be said to furtherfrustrate the ability of the police to 
comply with wider legal safeguarding duties created not just by government policy but by the 
common law, for example, of England and Wales. In short, the Scheme is all the less effective for the 
fact that warnings cannot be given to members of the public about previous violentbehaviour of a 
person's partner, full stop - let alone the supposed bar on any disclosure of an actual (spent) 
conviction. 
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Overall, I am not sure it would be certainly unlawful in all cases to purportedly breach the rules of 
the Scheme guidance, or indeed, the provisions of the 1974 Act as they supposedly apply to the 
Scheme, by disclosing spent convictions using common law powers with the aims(and duties) of 
public protection, since the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
place positive obligations to protect life or to take steps to prevent 'inhuman or degrading 
treatment' arising from domestic violence. This is a context which could include disclosing 
information (and maybe spent convictions) in potentialdomestic violence contexts, I would argue. In 
some ways then, by purporting to completely preclude the disclosure of all spent convictions and 
related information, the Scheme guidance could be said to be overly inflexible on this front. This is 
ultimately however, a matter of statutory interpretation, and how one might construe and define 
common law powers. But I feel it is a point worth making that the duties owed by the police to 
potential victims of domestic violence, due to 'positive obligations' in human rights law, are 
something that can be the basis of a valid criticism of the current operation of the Scheme, in 
relation to a purported restriction of the Scheme to only disclosures of unspent convictions and 
related information; just  as there can at the same time be a valid criticism of the current operation 
of the Scheme based on the erosion of the (procedural and) privacy rights or right to a private and 
family life of (former) domestic violence perpetrators21. 
 
I cannot, for one, believe that the courts, or the drafters of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, 
would be expected to take a strictly literal approach to defining whether a 'positive obligation' to 
protect and uphold the rights of (potential) victims of domestic violence, including their right to life 
under Article 2 ECHR even, is the kind of obligation addressed by the broad language of S.4(3)(a) of 
the 1974 Act (even if the current Scheme guidance is based on this assumption). 
 
This is really a discussion about two competing sets of obligations that would perhaps be hard to 
choose between in the most serious cases of risk, where a disclosure of a spent conviction or other 
information relating to it might be preferable  - one from the 1974 Act, which is about seeking to 
uphold the privacy rights of the rehabilitated, given Article 8 of the ECHR, and one which is about 
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seeking to protect vulnerable members of society at the most grave risk of potentially lethal 
domestic violence. As the wording of the relevant Authorised Professional Practice guidance, 
produced by the College of Policing and under consultation in early 2015 indicates, and rightly so: 
"All decisions should be made ethically, in accordance with the laws and powers that apply and 
driven by a selfless intention to make potential victims as safe as possible."22 
 
As such, over time we might expect to see the Home Office guidance on the Scheme re-drafted in 
more detail with an emphasis on the 'positive obligation' issue in relation to protecting victims' 
human rights through information disclosures. 
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